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NOTICE: This opinion is subject to formal revision before publication in the
preliminary print of the United States Reports.  Readers are requested to
notify the Reporter of Decisions, Supreme Court of the United States, Wash-
ington, D.C. 20543, of any typographical or other formal errors, in order that
corrections may be made before the preliminary print goes to press.
SUPREME COURT OF THE UNITED STATES
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No. 93-986
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JOSEPH McINTYRE, executor of estate of MAR-
GARET McINTYRE, deceased, PETITIONER v.
OHIO ELECTIONS COMMISSION
on writ of certiorari to the supreme court
of ohio
[April 19, 1995]

  Justice Stevens delivered the opinion of the Court.
    The question presented is whether an Ohio statute
that prohibits the distribution of anonymous campaign
literature is a -law . . . abridging the freedom of speech-
within the meaning of the First Amendment.

                            I
  On April 27, 1988, Margaret McIntyre distributed
leaflets to persons attending a public meeting at the
Blendon Middle School in Westerville, Ohio.  At this
meeting, the superintendent of schools planned to
discuss an imminent referendum on a proposed school
tax levy.  The leaflets expressed Mrs. McIntyre's opposi-
tion to the levy.  There is no suggestion that the text
of her message was false, misleading, or libelous.  She
had composed and printed it on her home computer and
had paid a professional printer to make additional
copies.  Some of the handbills identified her as the
author; others merely purported to express the views of
-CONCERNED PARENTS AND TAX PAYERS.-  Except
for the help provided by her son and a friend, who
placed some of the leaflets on car windshields in the
school parking lot, Mrs. McIntyre acted independently.
  While Mrs. McIntyre distributed her handbills, an
official of the school district, who supported the tax
proposal, advised her that the unsigned leaflets did not
conform to the Ohio election laws.  Undeterred, Mrs.
McIntyre appeared at another meeting on the next
evening and handed out more of the handbills.
  The proposed school levy was defeated at the next two
elections, but it finally passed on its third try in
November 1988.  Five months later, the same school
official filed a complaint with the Ohio Elections Com-
mission charging that Mrs. McIntyre's distribution of
unsigned leaflets violated 3599.09(A) of the Ohio Code.
The Commission agreed and imposed a fine of $100.
  The Franklin County Court of Common Pleas reversed.
Finding that Mrs. McIntyre did not -mislead the public
nor act in a surreptitious manner,- the court concluded
that the statute was unconstitutional as applied to her
conduct.  App. to Pet. for Cert. A-34 to A-35.  The
Ohio Court of Appeals, by a divided vote, reinstated the
fine.  Notwithstanding doubts about the continuing
validity of a 1922 decision of the Ohio Supreme Court
upholding the statutory predecessor of 3599.09(A), the
majority considered itself bound by that precedent.  Id.,
at A-20 to A-21, citing State v. Babst, 104 Ohio St.
167, 135 N. E. 525 (1922).  The dissenting judge thought
that our intervening decision in Talley v. California, 362
U. S. 60 (1960), in which we invalidated a city ordinance
prohibiting all anonymous leafletting, compelled the Ohio
court to adopt a narrowing construction of the statute to
save its constitutionality.  App. to Pet. for Cert. A-30
to A-31.
  The Ohio Supreme Court affirmed by a divided vote.
The majority distinguished Mrs. McIntyre's case from
Talley on the ground that 3599.09(A) -has as its
purpose the identification of persons who distribute
materials containing false statements.-  67 Ohio St. 3d
391, 394, 618 N. E. 2d 152, 154 (1993).  The Ohio court
believed that such a law should be upheld if the burdens
imposed on the First Amendment rights of voters are
-reasonable- and -nondiscriminatory.-  Id., at 396, 618
N. E. 2d, at 155, quoting Anderson v. Celebrezze, 460
U. S. 780, 788 (1983).  Under that standard, the
majority concluded that the statute was plainly valid:
-The minor requirement imposed by R.C. 3599.09
that those persons producing campaign literature
identify themselves as the source thereof neither
impacts the content of their message nor significantly
burdens their ability to have it disseminated.  This
burden is more than counterbalanced by the state
interest in providing the voters to whom the mes-
sage is directed with a mechanism by which they
may better evaluate its validity.  Moreover, the law
serves to identify those who engage in fraud, libel or
false advertising.  Not only are such interests
sufficient to overcome the minor burden placed upon
such persons, these interests were specifically
acknowledged in [First National Bank of Boston v.]
Bellotti[, 435 U. S. 765 (1978),] to be regulations
of the sort which would survive constitutional scru-
tiny.-  67 Ohio St. 3d, at 396, 618 N. E. 2d, at
155-156.
  In dissent, Justice Wright argued that the statute
should be tested under a more severe standard because
of its significant effect -on the ability of individual
citizens to freely express their views in writing on
political issues.-  Id., at 398, 618 N. E. 2d, at 156-157.
He concluded that 3599.09(A) -is not narrowly tailored
to serve a compelling state interest and is, therefore,
unconstitutional as applied to McIntyre.-  Id., at 401,
618 N. E. 2d, at 159.
  Mrs. McIntyre passed away during the pendency of
this litigation.  Even though the amount in controversy
is only $100, petitioner, as the executor of her estate,
has pursued her claim in this Court.  Our grant of
certiorari, 510 U. S. ___ (1994), reflects our agreement
with his appraisal of the importance of the question
presented.

                           II
  Ohio maintains that the statute under review is a
reasonable regulation of the electoral process.  The State
does not suggest that all anonymous publications are
pernicious or that a statute totally excluding them from
the marketplace of ideas would be valid.  This is a wise
(albeit implicit) concession, for the anonymity of an
author is not ordinarily a sufficient reason to exclude
her work product from the protections of the First
Amendment.
  -Anonymous pamphlets, leaflets, brochures and even
books have played an important role in the progress of
mankind.-  Talley v. California, 362 U. S. 60, 64 (1960).
Great works of literature have frequently been produced
by authors writing under assumed names.  Despite
readers' curiosity and the public's interest in identifying
the creator of a work of art, an author generally is free
to decide whether or not to disclose her true identity.
The decision in favor of anonymity may be motivated by
fear of economic or official retaliation, by concern about
social ostracism, or merely by a desire to preserve as
much of one's privacy as possible.  Whatever the
motivation may be, at least in the field of literary
endeavor, the interest in having anonymous works enter
the marketplace of ideas unquestionably outweighs any
public interest in requiring disclosure as a condition of
entry.  Accordingly, an author's decision to remain
anonymous, like other decisions concerning omissions or
additions to the content of a publication, is an aspect of
the freedom of speech protected by the First Amend-
ment.
  The freedom to publish anonymously extends beyond
the literary realm.  In Talley, the Court held that the
First Amendment protects the distribution of unsigned
handbills urging readers to boycott certain Los Angeles
merchants who were allegedly engaging in discrimina-
tory employment practices.  362 U. S. 60.  Writing for
the Court, Justice Black noted that -[p]ersecuted groups
and sects from time to time throughout history have
been able to criticize oppressive practices and laws
either anonymously or not at all.-  Id., at 64.  Justice
Black recalled England's abusive press licensing laws
and seditious libel prosecutions, and he reminded us
that even the arguments favoring the ratification of the
Constitution advanced in the Federalist Papers were
published under fictitious names.  Id., at 64-65.  On
occasion, quite apart from any threat of persecution, an
advocate may believe her ideas will be more persuasive
if her readers are unaware of her identity.  Anonymity
thereby provides a way for a writer who may be person-
ally unpopular to ensure that readers will not prejudge
her message simply because they do not like its propo-
nent.  Thus, even in the field of political rhetoric, where
-the identity of the speaker is an important component
of many attempts to persuade,- City of Ladue v. Gilleo,
512 U. S. ___, ___ (1994) (slip op., at 13), the most
effective advocates have sometimes opted for anonymity.
The specific holding in Talley related to advocacy of an
economic boycott, but the Court's reasoning embraced a
respected tradition of anonymity in the advocacy of
political causes.  This tradition is perhaps best exem-
plified by the secret ballot, the hard-won right to vote
one's conscience without fear of retaliation.

                           III
  California had defended the Los Angeles ordinance at
issue in Talley as a law -aimed at providing a way to
identify those responsible for fraud, false advertising and
libel.-  362 U. S., at 64.  We rejected that argument
because nothing in the text or legislative history of the
ordinance limited its application to those evils.  Ibid.
We then made clear that we did -not pass on the
validity of an ordinance limited to prevent these or any
other supposed evils.-  Ibid.  The Ohio statute likewise
contains no language limiting its application to fraudu-
lent, false, or libelous statements; to the extent, there-
fore, that Ohio seeks to justify 3599.09(A) as a means
to prevent the dissemination of untruths, its defense
must fail for the same reason given in Talley.  As the
facts of this case demonstrate, the ordinance plainly
applies even when there is no hint of falsity or libel.
  Ohio's statute does, however, contain a different
limitation: It applies only to unsigned documents
designed to influence voters in an election.  In contrast,
the Los Angeles ordinance prohibited all anonymous
handbilling -in any place under any circumstances.-  Id.,
at 60-61.  For that reason, Ohio correctly argues that
Talley does not necessarily control the disposition of this
case.  We must, therefore, decide whether and to what
extent the First Amendment's protection of anonymity
encompasses documents intended to influence the
electoral process.
  Ohio places its principal reliance on cases such as
Anderson v. Celebrezze, 460 U. S. 780 (1983); Storer v.
Brown, 415 U. S. 724 (1974); and Burdick v. Takushi,
504 U. S. ___ (1992), in which we reviewed election code
provisions governing the voting process itself.  See
Anderson, supra (filing deadlines); Storer, supra (ballot
access); Burdick, supra (write-in voting); see also
Tashjian v. Republican Party of Connecticut, 479 U. S.
208 (1986) (eligibility of independent voters to vote in
party primaries).  In those cases we refused to adopt
-any `litmus-paper test' that will separate valid from
invalid restrictions.-  Anderson, 460 U. S., at 789,
quoting Storer, 415 U. S., at 730.  Instead, we pursued
an analytical process comparable to that used by courts
-in ordinary litigation-: we considered the relative
interests of the State and the injured voters, and we
evaluated the extent to which the State's interests
necessitated the contested restrictions.  Anderson, 460
U. S., at 789.  Applying similar reasoning in this case,
the Ohio Supreme Court upheld 3599.09(A) as a
-reasonable- and -nondiscriminatory- burden on the
rights of voters.  67 Ohio St. 3d 391, 396, 618 N. E. 2d
152, 155 (1993), quoting Anderson, 460 U. S., at 788.
  The -ordinary litigation- test does not apply here.
Unlike the statutory provisions challenged in Storer and
Anderson, 3599.09(A) of the Ohio Code does not control
the mechanics of the electoral process.  It is a regulation
of pure speech.  Moreover, even though this provision
applies evenhandedly to advocates of differing view-
points, it is a direct regulation of the content of speech.
Every written document covered by the statute must
contain -the name and residence or business address of
the chairman, treasurer, or secretary of the organization
issuing the same, or the person who issues, makes, or is
responsible therefor.-  Ohio Rev. Code Ann. 3599.09(A)
(1988).  Furthermore, the category of covered documents
is defined by their content-only those publications
containing speech designed to influence the voters in an
election need bear the required markings.  Ibid.
Consequently, we are not faced with an ordinary election
restriction; this case -involves a limitation on political
expression subject to exacting scrutiny.-  Meyer v. Grant,
486 U. S. 414, 420 (1988).

  Indeed, as we have explained on many prior occasions,
the category of speech regulated by the Ohio statute
occupies the core of the protection afforded by the First
Amendment:
-Discussion of public issues and debate on the
qualifications of candidates are integral to the
operation of the system of government established
by our Constitution.  The First Amendment affords
the broadest protection to such political expression
in order `to assure [the] unfettered interchange of
ideas for the bringing about of political and social
changes desired by the people.'  Roth v. United
States, 354 U. S. 476, 484 (1957).  Although First
Amendment protections are not confined to `the
exposition of ideas,' Winters v. New York, 333 U. S.
507, 510 (1948), `there is practically universal
agreement that a major purpose of that Amendment
was to protect the free discussion of governmental
affairs, . . . of course includ[ing] discussions of
candidates . . . .'  Mills v. Alabama, 384 U. S. 214,
218 (1966).  This no more than reflects our `pro-
found national commitment to the principle that
debate on public issues should be uninhibited,
robust, and wide-open,' New York Times Co. v.
Sullivan, 376 U. S. 254, 270 (1964).  In a republic
where the people are sovereign, the ability of the
citizenry to make informed choices among candidates
for office is essential, for the identities of those who
are elected will inevitably shape the course that we
follow as a nation.  As the Court observed in
Monitor Patriot Co. v. Roy, 401 U. S. 265, 272
(1971), `it can hardly be doubted that the constitu-
tional guarantee has its fullest and most urgent
application precisely to the conduct of campaigns for
political office.'-  Buckley v. Valeo, 424 U. S. 1,
14-15 (1976).
  Of course, core political speech need not center on a
candidate for office.  The principles enunciated in
Buckley extend equally to issue-based elections such as
the school-tax referendum that Mrs. McIntyre sought to
influence through her handbills.  See First Nat. Bank of
Boston v. Bellotti, 435 U. S. 765, 776-777 (1978) (speech
on income-tax referendum -is at the heart of the First
Amendment's protection-).  Indeed, the speech in which
Mrs. McIntyre engaged-handing out leaflets in the
advocacy of a politically controversial viewpoint-is the
essence of First Amendment expression.  See Interna-
tional Society for Krishna Consciousness v. Lee, 505
U. S. ___ (1992); Lovell v. Griffin, 303 U. S. 444 (1938).
That this advocacy occurred in the heat of a controver-
sial referendum vote only strengthens the protection
afforded to Ms. McIntyre's expression: urgent, important,
and effective speech can be no less protected than
impotent speech, lest the right to speak be relegated to
those instances when it is least needed.  See Terminiello
v. Chicago, 337 U. S. 1, 4 (1949).  No form of speech is
entitled to greater constitutional protection than Mrs.
McIntyre's.
  When a law burdens core political speech, we apply
-exacting scrutiny,- and we uphold the restriction only
if it is narrowly tailored to serve an overriding state
interest.  See, e.g., Bellotti, 435 U. S., at 786.  Our
precedents thus make abundantly clear that the Ohio
Supreme Court applied a significantly more lenient

standard than is appropriate in a case of this kind.

                           IV
  Nevertheless, the State argues that even under the
strictest standard of review, the disclosure requirement
in 3599.09(A) is justified by two important and legiti-
mate state interests.  Ohio judges its interest in pre-
venting fraudulent and libelous statements and its
interest in providing the electorate with relevant
information to be sufficiently compelling to justify the
anonymous speech ban.  These two interests necessarily
overlap to some extent, but it is useful to discuss them
separately.
  Insofar as the interest in informing the electorate
means nothing more than the provision of additional
information that may either buttress or undermine the
argument in a document, we think the identity of the
speaker is no different from other components of the
document's content that the author is free to include or
exclude.  We have already held that the State may
not compel a newspaper that prints editorials critical of
a particular candidate to provide space for a reply by
the candidate.  Miami Herald Publishing Co. v. Tornillo,
418 U. S. 241 (1974).  The simple interest in providing
voters with additional relevant information does not
justify a state requirement that a writer make state-
ments or disclosures she would otherwise omit.  More-
over, in the case of a handbill written by a private
citizen who is not known to the recipient, the name and
address of the author adds little, if anything, to the
reader's ability to evaluate the document's message.
Thus, Ohio's informational interest is plainly insufficient
to support the constitutionality of its disclosure require-
ment.
  The state interest in preventing fraud and libel stands
on a different footing.  We agree with Ohio's submission
that this interest carries special weight during election
campaigns when false statements, if credited, may have
serious adverse consequences for the public at large.
Ohio does not, however, rely solely on 3599.09(A) to
protect that interest.  Its Election Code includes detailed
and specific prohibitions against making or disseminat-
ing false statements during political campaigns.  Ohio
Rev. Code Ann. 3599.09.1(B), 3599.09.2(B) (1988).
These regulations apply both to candidate elections and
to issue-driven ballot measures.  Thus, Ohio's prohibi-
tion of anonymous leaflets plainly is not its principal
weapon against fraud.  Rather, it serves as an aid to
enforcement of the specific prohibitions and as a deter-
rent to the making of false statements by unscrupulous
prevaricators.  Although these ancillary benefits are
assuredly legitimate, we are not persuaded that they
justify 3599.09(A)'s extremely broad prohibition.
  As this case demonstrates, the prohibition encompasses
documents that are not even arguably false or mislead-
ing.  It applies not only to the activities of candidates
and their organized supporters, but also to individuals
acting independently and using only their own modest
resources.  It applies not only to elections of public
officers, but also to ballot issues that present neither a
substantial risk of libel nor any potential appearance of
corrupt advantage.  It applies not only to leaflets
distributed on the eve of an election, when the opportu-
nity for reply is limited, but also to those distributed
months in advance.  It applies no matter what the
character or strength of the author's interest in anonym-
ity.  Moreover, as this case also demonstrates, the
absence of the author's name on a document does not
necessarily protect either that person or a distributor of
a forbidden document from being held responsible for
compliance with the election code.  Nor has the State
explained why it can more easily enforce the direct bans
on disseminating false documents against anonymous
authors and distributors than against wrongdoers who
might use false names and addresses in an attempt to
avoid detection.  We recognize that a State's enforcement
interest might justify a more limited identification
requirement, but Ohio has shown scant cause for
inhibiting the leafletting at issue here.

                            V
  Finally, Ohio vigorously argues that our opinions in
First Nat. Bank of Boston v. Bellotti, 435 U. S. 765
(1978), and Buckley v. Valeo, 424 U. S. 1 (1976), amply
support the constitutionality of its disclosure require-
ment.  Neither case is controlling: the former concerned
the scope of First Amendment protection afforded to
corporations; the relevant portion of the latter concerned
mandatory disclosure of campaign-related expenditures.
Neither case involved a prohibition of anonymous
campaign literature.
  In Bellotti, we reversed a judgment of the Supreme
Judicial Court of Massachusetts sustaining a state law
that prohibited corporate expenditures designed to
influence the vote on referendum proposals.  435 U. S.
765.  The Massachusetts court had held that the First
Amendment protects corporate speech only if its message
pertains directly to the business interests of the corpora-
tion.  Id., at 771-772.  Consistently with our holding
today, we noted that the -inherent worth of the speech
in terms of its capacity for informing the public does not
depend upon the identity of its source, whether corpora-
tion, association, union, or individual.-  Id., at 777.  We
also made it perfectly clear that we were not deciding
whether the First Amendment's protection of corporate
speech is coextensive with the protection it affords to
individuals.  Accordingly, although we commented in
dicta on the prophylactic effect of requiring identification
of the source of corporate advertising, that footnote
did not necessarily apply to independent communications
by an individual like Mrs. McIntyre.
  Our reference in the Bellotti footnote to the -prophy-
lactic effect- of disclosure requirements cited a portion
of our earlier opinion in Buckley, in which we stressed
the importance of providing -the electorate with informa-
tion `as to where political campaign money comes from
and how it is spent by the candidate.'-  424 U. S., at
66.  We observed that the -sources of a candidate's
financial support also alert the voter to the interests to
which a candidate is most likely to be responsive and
thus facilitate predictions of future performance in
office.-  Id., at 67.  Those comments concerned contribu-
tions to the candidate or expenditures authorized by the
candidate or his responsible agent.  They had no
reference to the kind of independent activity pursued by
Mrs. McIntyre.  Required disclosures about the level of
financial support a candidate has received from various
sources are supported by an interest in avoiding the
appearance of corruption that has no application to this
case.
  True, in another portion of the Buckley opinion we
expressed approval of a requirement that even -indepen-
dent expenditures- in excess of a threshold level be
reported to the Federal Election Commission.  Id., at
75-76.  But that requirement entailed nothing more
than an identification to the Commission of the amount
and use of money expended in support of a candidate.
See id., at 157-159, 160 (reproducing relevant portions
of the statute).  Though such mandatory reporting
undeniably impedes protected First Amendment activity,
the intrusion is a far cry from compelled self-identifica-
tion on all election-related writings.  A written election-
related document-particularly a leaflet-is often a
personally crafted statement of a political viewpoint.
Mrs. McIntyre's handbills surely fit that description.  As
such, identification of the author against her will is
particularly intrusive; it reveals unmistakably the
content of her thoughts on a controversial issue.
Disclosure of an expenditure and its use, without more,
reveals far less information.  It may be information that
a person prefers to keep secret, and undoubtedly it often
gives away something about the spender's political
views.  Nonetheless, even though money may -talk,- its
speech is less specific, less personal, and less provocative
than a handbill-and as a result, when money supports
an unpopular viewpoint it is less likely to precipitate
retaliation.
  Not only is the Ohio statute's infringement on speech
more intrusive than the Buckley disclosure requirement,
but it rests on different and less powerful state inter-
ests.  The Federal Election Campaign Act of 1971, at
issue in Buckley, regulates only candidate elections, not
referenda or other issue-based ballot measures; and we
construed -independent expenditures- to mean only those
expenditures that -expressly advocate the election or
defeat of a clearly identified candidate.-  Id., at 80.  In
candidate elections, the Government can identify a
compelling state interest in avoiding the corruption that
might result from campaign expenditures.  Disclosure of
expenditures lessens the risk that individuals will spend
money to support a candidate as a quid pro quo for
special treatment after the candidate is in office.
Curriers of favor will be deterred by the knowledge that
all expenditures will be scrutinized by the Federal
Election Commission and by the public for just this sort
of abuse.  Moreover, the federal Act contains numer-
ous legitimate disclosure requirements for campaign
organizations; the similar requirements for independent
expenditures serve to ensure that a campaign organiza-
tion will not seek to evade disclosure by routing its
expenditures through individual supporters.  See
Buckley, 424 U. S., at 76.  In short, although Buckley
may permit a more narrowly drawn statute, it surely is
not authority for upholding Ohio's open-ended provi-
sion.
                           VI
  Under our Constitution, anonymous pamphleteering is
not a pernicious, fraudulent practice, but an honorable
tradition of advocacy and of dissent.  Anonymity is a
shield from the tyranny of the majority.  See generally
J. S. Mill, On Liberty, in On Liberty and Considerations
on Representative Government 1, 3-4 (R. McCallum ed.

1947).  It thus exemplifies the purpose behind the Bill
of Rights, and of the First Amendment in particular: to
protect unpopular individuals from retaliation-and their
ideas from suppression-at the hand of an intolerant
society.  The right to remain anonymous may be abused
when it shields fraudulent conduct.  But political speech
by its nature will sometimes have unpalatable conse-
quences, and, in general, our society accords greater
weight to the value of free speech than to the dangers
of its misuse.  See Abrams v. United States, 250 U. S.
616, 630-31 (1919) (Holmes, J., dissenting).  Ohio has
not shown that its interest in preventing the misuse of
anonymous election-related speech justifies a prohibition
of all uses of that speech.  The State may, and does,
punish fraud directly.  But it cannot seek to punish
fraud indirectly by indiscriminately outlawing a category
of speech, based on its content, with no necessary
relationship to the danger sought to be prevented.  One
would be hard pressed to think of a better example of
the pitfalls of Ohio's blunderbuss approach than the
facts of the case before us.
  The judgment of the Ohio Supreme Court is reversed.

                                      It is so ordered.